



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THE
IMPORTANT QUESTION

CONCERNING

INVASIONS, || RAISING the
A SEA-WAR, || MILITIA;

AND PAYING

Subsidies for Foreign TROOPS;

Fairly and impartially stated on both Sides,

AND

Humbly referred to the Judgment of the
PUBLIC.

Being a new Edition of the Papers first published
in the EVENING ADVERTISER.

L O N D O N:

Printed for R. GRIFFITHS, at the *Dunciad* in
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THE
IMPORTANT QUESTION

OF THE

UNION OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE

AND

THEir INTERESTS

IN THE

WEST

AND THE
FUTURE OF THE

UNITED STATES

AND THE

CONSTITUTION

OF THE


(RPLC)



THE
IMPORTANT QUESTION
CONCERNING
INVASIONS.

Reasons on one Side of the Question.

I. *Concerning Invasions.*

REAT BRITAIN, being
an Island, is secure from an
Invasion, and having no De-
signs of making Conquest,
and no Interests of her own
to pursue on the Continent, hath no need
of foreign Assistance.

B

II. *Concerning*

II. *Concerning a Sea-War.*

The Strength of Great Britain lies in her Fleets : These should be her principal, her only Care. And if we carry on the War wholly by Sea, and have nothing to do with the Continent, we shall have every Thing to hope in regard to annoying our Enemies, and nothing to fear in respect to ourselves. For by destroying their Shipping, we ruin their Trade ; and when their Trade is gone, the Sinews of War are gone likewise.

III. *Concerning raising the Militia.*

If any Dangers were to be apprehended from a threatened Invasion, which for Argument's Sake we will deign to suppose, this Danger might be easily repelled by the internal Strength of Great Britain. For the Inhabitants of this Island, on the lowest Computation,

Computation, are eight Millions of Souls ; one Eighth of which are capable of bearing Arms in Time of Necessity : But even one hundredth Part, i. e. 80,000 Men, are full sufficient to defeat any Number of Troops that can be landed on our Coasts. Let therefore the Militia be raised ; let the Natives be inured to Arms : Let those fight for Liberty and Property, who have Liberty and Property to lose ; and then there is no fear, but they will shew themselves Men : The brave English Spirit will again revive ; and we shall once more prove ourselves the true Descendants of those glorious Ancestors, who dyed the Plains of Agincourt and Cressy with the Blood of Thousands, and ten Thousand perfidious French.

IV. *Concerning Subsidies, and hiring foreign
Troops.*

Seeing Great Britain may be thus so well defended by her own proper Force, why should we go about to lavish away our Money in useless, expensive, foreign Subsidies? Why send those precious Treasures abroad, earned by the Sweat of English Brows, which ought to be kept at home to pay our own Troops, to support our own Trade and Manufactures, and circulate among ourselves? Are we in such Circumstances as to send Millions abroad, never to return again? Or will any of our Neighbours, that are now gaping to receive English Gold, will they generously send back a few Shillings in Pity and Compassion to us, after we have spent and *subsidied* away the last Farthing? No; they will not; they will only laugh at us for our foolish

foolish ill-placed Generosity, and senseless Conduct. Let us therefore be wise in Time; and let Britons remember, that if there is to be a War on the Continent, it is not, it cannot be the War of Great Britain. Let those therefore, whom it may concern, *whosoever they are*, be at the Expence of it: And let fair Albion, the Mistress of the Sea, the Queen of the Ocean, prove to the wondering Nations the Prowess of her Arms, on her own Element.

Reasons on the other Side of the Question.

I. Concerning Invasions.

I. Great Britain is an Island, separated from France by so narrow a Sea, that Boats can row, or sail over in a few Hours: And the Coasts of Essex, Kent, Suffex, and
Hamp-

Hampshire, are as well known to the Smugglers of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Dieppe, as their own Harbours. These Men, therefore, are already qualified to be Pilots in any Expedition against this Kingdom : And, notwithstanding the most numerous Fleet, and the greatest Vigilance on our Part, Great Britain can be invaded from all, or any of these Ports, in flat-bottom'd Boats, under the following Circumstances : First, It can be invaded when the Wind blows a brisk southerly Gale ; because the same Wind which would waft them over, would confine our Ships in their Ports. Secondly, It can be invaded in a dark Night, or in foggy Weather ; because we have many Proofs, now fresh in our Memories, that Objects much greater than open Boats, even large capital Ships, can pass, and repass an Enemy's Fleet in foggy Weather, or a dark Night. Thirdly, Great Britain can be invaded, though

though in Sight of the whole royal Navy and all the Tenders belonging to it, if the French Transports should take the Advantage of a dead Calm ; and such Calms there are sometimes for Days together : nor is it in the Power of the best Commanders, or the most active Sailors, to prevent such a Misfortune. For Ships cannot make use of their Oars, so as to come up with open Boats : And as to the Long-Boats of Men of War, what are they against a Fleet of Transports, at least four Times their Number, and of superior Strength in every Respect ? Suppose, therefore, that 500 flat-bottom'd Boats are built, or, according to the Information lately received, that much such a Number are now building, capable of containing a hundred Men each : Or, in Fact, that even the Fishing-Boats already on the Coast, which cannot be less than six Hundred, are taken up by the French Govern-

Government for that Purpose : — In either Case an Army of fifty Thousand effective Men may be landed within three Days March of the Capital. And if such a Disaster should ever happen, it would then be too late to say, *Who could have thought it?* — Men of Sense and Discernment did ever think it, and must think it ; because the Circumstances of the Case speak for themselves : And though our Situation as an Island gives us some Advantage, yet it would be the highest Imprudence to risk all upon that alone ; especially when we can have Recourse to other Measures to co-operate with our present Advantage, and much more efficacious, *and much less expensive*, than any which our modern Patriots propose, as shall be shewed in the Sequel.

In short, the Notion that Great Britain has no Concern, and ought to have none
with

with that Part of the Continent, *which is at our very Doors*, is so very extravagant and absurd, that it never entered into any Man's Heart till of late Years, and is never vented by any now, but by those who are either the determined Enemies of the Government, or want to create a Disturbance in the Administration. The Conduct of Queen Elizabeth is often quoted on this Occasion: To her Conduct therefore let the Appeal be made; and let that be decisive. See the several Speeches of the Lord-Keeper to the Parliament; and consider the numerous Forces and vast Sums of Money she sent to the Aid of the Dutch, and the King of France, in order to prevent, as she expressly declares, the Sea-Coasts of Holland, Flanders, and France, from falling into the Hands of her Enemy the King of Spain; *from whence he might so easily invade her*. These Sums, and these Forces, were vast indeed, considering the Strength of the Kingdom then and now; yet she

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thought

thought them all well bestowed, as they cut out work for him elsewhere, and diverted his Attention from invading this Island, Nay, the Lord-Keeper says in his Speech of the 9th of April, 1593, that since the King of Spain had gotten Possession of the Sea-Coasts of Britanny, and *had built Ships of a smaller Size*, such as the English, Flemings and French then chiefly used, which were small indeed, England was in more Danger of being invaded than ever. What then would he have said, had he lived in our Times, when the Power that can annoy us, is not only possessed of the Sea-Coasts of Brittany, but all the Coasts of Normandy, Picardy, and a great Part of Flanders; and hath a mighty Kingdom behind those Provinces to bring Troops to the Sea-side? Yet Great Britain is an Island, and cannot be invaded! Great Britain hath nothing to fear! No Concern on the Continent, &c. &c. Can Men of Sense

Sense believe this? Can Men of common Honesty assert it?—

II. *Concerning a Sea-War.*

It is freely acknowledged, That the *chief* Strength of Great Britain consists in her numerous and well-appointed Fleets. And these Fleets are, at this Day, more numerous and better appointed (Thanks to our Gracious Sovereign, and to those whom he has commissioned to have the Superintendency over them) than ever they were since the Foundation of the Monarchy. But need you be told, that the Sea is in many Places wide, and in all Places an unstable Element? And must I again repeat, That a southerly Wind, a dark Night, foggy Weather, or a dead Calm, may foil the best Endeavours of the ablest Commanders, and bring, or permit to be brought, a numerous Army to our Coasts? If such an Army was once landed, what

Lines, what Fortifications have we to withstand it? And doth not the very Goodness of our Roads, and the late Improvements of Carriage, lay open the whole Kingdom to be ravaged from End to End? Now, when an Army is once landed, it cannot only march without being stopped by Lines, Fortifications, Mountains, Forests, Passes, &c. but by Means of the present Wealth of the Country, and the general Plenty of Cattle, Corn, and Victuals, it can proceed without Interruption with Regard to Provisions, and find good comfortable Quarters wherever it comes. — Every one of these Circumstances ought to be attended to by those Gentlemen, who believe, or pretend to believe, either that an Invasion is an impossible Thing, or, that a Body of Troops once landed could make no Progress, and must be ruined for Want of Subsistence. Nay, it is much to be suspected, that many of our present swaggering

ing Heroes, who talk so much about beating the French, would be among the first to turn their Backs, and leave their Country a Prey to those very French, whom they affect so much to despise.

As to the Notion, that if we take the French Shipping we must destroy all their Trade, and consequently render them unable to carry on the War ;— The Notion is a very false one, as may be proved by the following Reasons :

1. A Nation may be industrious within itself, and carry on a great internal Commerce without any foreign Trade at all : And if the People are all industrious in working for each other, that Industry and mutual Employment must be *Riches*. (See B. Berkley's Queries) But whoever asserts that foreign Commerce is the only Riches, must likewise assert, that if there was such
a Thing

a Thing as *universal Monarchy*, there could be no Riches at all, because in that Case there could be no foreign Commerce ; he must also assert, that if a Discovery was now to be made of a large Island or Kingdom, where the People were all industrious among themselves, but had no Inter-
course with the rest of the World, the People of that Island, though they had Plenty of good Food, good Raiment, and good Dwellings, must nevertheless be poor, wretched, and miserable, because they had no foreign Commerce ; nay, he must maintain, that the Cities of Hamburgh and Geneva have the best Title to be the richest Cities in the World, because ALL their Commerce is foreign ; the Scantiness of their Territories not allowing any other ; the very Milk that is cried about the Streets, being the Produce of a foreign Country. To such Absurdities must those Men be
re-

reduced, who pretend to argue upon Points they have not at all considered.

2. The Notion is false even in Regard to *foreign* Trade : For France can carry on a foreign Trade *by Land* with several Parts of Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Flanders, inasmuch as all these Countries border upon the inland Parts of France. Therefore, *so far at least*, the taking of the French Shipping doth not destroy the Trade of France. But,

3. Tho' every Ship was taken, and the French had not one more remaining, it would not follow from thence, that *that* foreign Trade of France, which must be carried on by Means of Sea-carriage, would be totally destroyed. For other States, (unless our brave Hurlothrumbo's are determined to wage War with all the World) have a Right by the Law of Nations, to
carry

carry all Sorts of Commodities to France, military Stores only excepted, and to *buy* the Produce and Manufactures of France in Return, in Order to proceed to other Markets. Nay, the Produce and Manufactures of France, though expressly known and acknowledged to be *French Property*, may be carried in Dutch Bottoms, according to the Treaty which our Charles II. made with the Dutch. This Treaty, when first made, was intended to serve the English : But in the last War, it greatly turned against us ; and it seems by the Account we now have in our public Papers, that the French are again upon the Point of suspending their Laws for promoting their own Navigation, in Order to take the Advantage of this Circumstance, and to send their Goods in Dutch Bottoms during the present Broils, which will be a great Saving both of Freight and Insurance.

It

It is therefore by no Means so clear a Case, as is pretended, that by taking the French Shipping, we shall destroy *all* their Trade: Or that by carrying on the War wholly by Sea, we shall distress them to such a Degree as will compel them to come down on their Knees to sue for Peace. On the contrary it hath been evidently proved that a Country may be great and powerful, without much *Merchant* Shipping: And to illustrate this Proof by a Fact, let France herself stand as an Example. For the French were in their highest Glory for Wealth, Riches, and Manufactures, (as their own Historians justly observe) between the Years 1660 and 1700. But France at that Juncture, had very few *Merchant* Shipping, the Dutch and English performing the Part of Carriers to them: But to countervail that Defect, the French had much greater Numbers employed

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ployed in Woollen Stuffs, in Linen and Silks, in making Hats, Paper, Toys, and in Iron, Steel, Brass, Copper, and all the Branches of the Metal Trade, than they have at present. And it was upon the Strength of these Manufactures that Louis XIV. did such Wonders, waging two general Wars with all Europe combined against him, making Conquests and fortifying Towns without Number, building Palaces, and creating an astonishing Naval Force all of a sudden, having an hundred Line-of-Battle Ships in excellent Order at one Time, besides a proportionable Number of Frigates, Tenders, &c.

But what is the Inference from all this ?
 —Why surely a very plain, and a very important one, viz. That if the present State of France is so greatly sunk from what it was formerly ; and if we are raised above our former Condition, let us remember the
 old

old Proverb, *Let well alone*. Let us go on improving in the Arts of Peace, in which, from the very Nature of our Constitution, we are sure to be victorious; and let us, to use the Words of the highest Authority, avoid the lighting up a general War, as much as possible. France, though sunk, is still capable of exerting great Powers, and doing much Mischief, if provoked to Despair. And the more we use insulting Language, and opprobrious Terms against that high spirited Nation, ever jealous of their Glory, the likelier Means we take to recover them from their present Lethargy, to unite their divided and distracted Councils against us, and to shew us to our Cost, that we have taught them those good Lessons of domestick Oeconomy, Policy, and Unanimity, which of themselves they were not disposed to learn.—
 Something of this Nature begins to appear already, by their stationing such large Bo-

dies of Troops on their Frontiers, in order to invade us, in case we are *not prepared*, and to put us to an immense Expense *to be prepared*. By these Means they can make us spend twenty Shillings, to their one Shilling. — The great Question therefore is, What Methods can we take, in order to oblige them to spend as much, or near as much, as we do. — But before we come to that, we must discuss a previous Article, viz. Raising the Militia.

III. *Concerning raising the Militia.*

As to raising the Militia, and arming the Natives, concerning which the Practice of antient Rome and modern Switzerland are inconsiderately quoted, two Questions deserve to be examined, before you resolve on such an important Measure. I. Whether Rome and Switzerland were States addicted to

to Commerce and Manufactures? 2. Whether their civil Constitutions were similar to ours? As to the *first*, it is certain, that Commerce and Manufactures were not their Aim; the Trade of Rome being *to wage War with all the World*. And the Manufacture of Switzerland, if I may so call it, being *to hire themselves as Soldiers to fight other Men's Battles*. It is likewise as certain, that when common Labourers and Manufacturers have learnt the military Step, and a few martial Airs, they are fit for little else: Work and Industry then become a Burthen; and when once they come to value themselves as Gentlemen Soldiers, they scorn the dull Regularity and dishonourable Condition of low Mechanics. Nor is there in all History an Instance to be produced of the *same People* being famous for mechanic Arts, and Manufactures, and at the same Time renowned for a well disciplined and useful Militia.

Militia.—So far from it, that in Switzerland at this Day there are hardly any Manufactures and mechanic Arts, in Comparison to what there are in other Countries: And the Canton of Berne in particular, which is said to be able to raise 100,000 good Militia, send great Quantities of their Wool into France to be manufactured. Indeed a Caviller may object, if he pleases, that antient Egypt was an Exception to this Rule; because it was both a commercial, and a military State at the same Time. —But what I say is, that the *same People*, i. e. *the same Individuals* were not famous in both Respects. For in Egypt the military Class was quite a distinct People from the rest, whose Business was to fight; and they had no other Employ. If therefore we will make the Cases parallel, we must divide our People into the same Sort of Classes, viz. The Military, the Literati, the Mechanical

chanical, the Agrestic, &c. &c. And what then will become of our present Constitution.

Secondly, It is also to be considered, whether the civil Government of Great Britain is similar to that of ancient Rome, or modern Switzerland. For if it is not, it would be highly preposterous to apply the Regulations that are calculated for one Government, to another quite dissimilar to it. Now the *Basis* of the English Liberty at present, is the Freedom of Elections of Members of Parliament: And nothing should be attempted to be introduced that might infringe this Liberty; which, according to the Opinion of the Persons we have now to deal with, is too much infringed already. But how is it possible to preserve this Liberty from farther, and even fatal Infringements, if you introduce a national Militia, and all the Consequences attending it? For this Militia must have Officers, and these Officers

ters be armed with *discretionary*, nay *military* Powers: Otherwise your Militia will prove a mere headless Mob. Suppose therefore, that the Lord Lieutenant, the Colonels, the Major, and the respective Captains, have the Power of summoning the Militia together as often as they think proper; or if this should be fixed in Times of Peace by a positive Law, suppose them only vested with the Right of nominating the Place and Time of Day, and prescribing *how long* the Troops shall be doing Exercise, and remain under Arms: Allow them also the Power of inflicting some Kind of Punishment for *wilful* Disobedience of Orders, embezzling of their Arms and Ammunition, Neglect of Duty, or Refusal to learn the Exercise.

[For, with humble Submission, unless you allow these, and much greater Powers than these, to your Militia-Officers, you may indeed get a Mob together to make
them

them drunk and idle, and to receive the Militia Pay, but you can never make them useful, or fit to face a regular, well-disciplined Army : Nay, in a Time of Invasion, you must carry the Point even so far as to arm your Officers with the Power of inflicting Death itself by Sentence of a Court-Martial ; or you have no Chance in fighting against an Army, where every Soldier knows, that it is instant Death for him to desert his Post.

When therefore, you have invested your Lord Lieutenant, and his Colonels, the Major, and the respective Captains, with these *military and discretionary* Powers,—Powers not only distinct from, but in many Respects contradictory to, the general System of your Laws: Permit me to ask, what Guards or Cautions have you to offer, that an electioneering Use will not be made of them? And how will you prevent these

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Officers

Officers from creating an Influence by means of such a vast, unlimited, and in many Respects, unlimitable Power, sufficient to overturn the whole Constitution? Sure I am, that if you will be determined by Matters of Fact and daily Experience, you have all the Reason in the World to conclude, that were such Powers vested in either Whig or Tory, the Court or the Country Party, an undue Application would be made of them to support their own Interests, and ruin their Adversaries.

But if this will not give you Content, and you will still appeal to other Countries, please to remember, that your favourite State of antient Rome, had no such Establishment as our House of Commons: And as to modern Switzerland, there's the Canton of Bern in particular, is an absolute Oligarchy, the Magistrates electing one another, in case of a Vacancy, without consulting the People at all, and governing in a very arbitrary Manner.

If

If you argue from the former State of England, when our Militia was kept up, it is proper to remind you, that the former State of England was a State of great Slavery in Regard to the Commons, and the common People. Vassalage and military Tenures were then in Use; and when they began to be abolished by the Power given to the Nobles to alienate their Lands, and by the Diffolution of Monasteries and Abbies, the Prerogative of the Crown ran so high, that the House of Commons was but a Cypher to what it is at present. Queen Elizabeth's Parliament was as much different from ours at this Day, as the Parliament of Paris is from that at Westminster.

If you argue from the Case of the City of London, whose Militia in the Civil Wars did surprising great Things; you must likewise prove to us, that the present Militia are animated with the same *enthusiastic* Spirit

both for civil and religious Liberty, which animated their Forefathers ; that there has been the same Cause for Years together to work them up ; the same Concurrence of various Circumstances ; and that in short, having caught the Flame, they are as ripe as ever to rush forth and fight the Lord's Battles, and as well disposed to fast and pray, and to hear a godly Lecture of four Hours long. Nay more, you must prove likewise, that the Constitution of the City of London is the Constitution of the whole Realm ; and that the Institution *of*, and voting *by* Liverymen, is the Manner of voting all over the Kingdom. Were indeed this the Case, were the Qualification for voting raised, and confined to the more substantial Part of the Inhabitants, something might be said in Favour of a National Militia : But as Matters stand with us, where the same Man would be almost universally both a Voter, and a Militia Man, it would be an Imprudence

dence next to Madness to attempt such an Establishment in our present Circumstances.

Lastly, if you argue from the present Practice of our Colonies in America; I have but a short Answer to return; viz. that these Colonies are as yet but in their infant State; and what might be proper for them may not be so for others. They have likewise few or none but French Militia, Hunters, and Indians to contend with; moreover, they themselves are chiefly Planters, Husbandmen, and Farmers, and very few Manufacturers; all these Circumstances are different from ours. They are likewise inured to Arms from their Infancy, both on Account of their Situation regarding the French and Indians, and also because many of them are obliged to hunt and beat the Woods for Game, Furrs, &c. And besides all this, it is visible, that the Remains of the Enthusiastic, Oliverian Spirit, are still alive among the People of New England, which Spirit
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is now kindled, and blazes out afresh. But if you look into the Behaviour, and examine the Conduct of almost all the other Governments, you'll have little to plead in regard to them on your Side the Question. And were I disposed to multiply Arguments, I could quote those Governments with better Authority, as Instances to prove the little Service to be expected from Militia, than you could the contrary.

Upon the whole, either therefore you must give up your favourite Scheme of a national Militia, or give up your present civil Liberties : For they are incompatible with each other. And it is idle and ridiculous to bring Examples from the English History in Support of your System, unless you can prove, that the *Natures*, as well as the *Names* of Things continue the same from those Days to this.—Indeed, if you will be content with such an House of Commons as were in being during the Lines of York and
Lan-

Lancaster, the Tudors, and the Stuart Families, you may establish a National Militia as soon as you please: For in such Circumstances, it would be of little Consequence, what electioneering Uses were made of them. Nay, it would be more than probable, that when a Seat in Parliament gave a Man but little Credit with the People, and less Power with the Prince, so few Persons would covet it, that Bribery and Corruption of any Sort, and in every Shape, would be extremely rare: It being a certain Truth, that all Temptations encrease or diminish according to the Degrees of Honour, Pleasure, or Profit attending the End in View. Therefore where there is none of these to be obtained, there can be no Temptation: But at the same Time, we must remember, that when this is the Case in regard to Members of Parliament, there will be no Liberty remaining; and then indeed no Man will bribe merely for the Sake of bribing.

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As to the great Feats done by the English Militia at the Battles of Agincourt and Cressy, a general Answer may suffice, viz. that if the Writers of any two rival Nations are determined to pick and cull all the Particulars wherein the one Nation happened to excel the other, either thro' good Fortune, the Bravery of the Troops, or the Conduct of the General, they may find Instances enough to represent themselves as a Race of the most perfect Heroes, and their Enemies as the most ignorant, or abject Cowards that ever breathed. This is frequently the Case between the English and French Historians: This is also the Case between the Scotch and English: For if the English boast of *two* signal Victories over the French, the Scotch make their Boast of *three* over the English, all in one Day, and by the same Body of Troops, without Rest or Refreshment; Victories obtained, not in these modern degenerate Days, but during the heroic

roic Age of good Old England, viz. in the Reign of Edward I. Now, if you will make use of such empty Puffs as these, by Way of Argument, I grant that they will serve very well to entertain a drunken Mob roaring round a Bonfire, or to harangue a Circle of Chairmen and Porters (with whom perhaps the Conceit may not be much amiss, that one Englishman is to beat ten Monsieurs) but Men of Sense and Judgement will always despise such stupid, unmeaning Stuff. Besides, it happens a little unfortunately, that these very Heroes, who beat the French at Agincourt and Cressy, I mean the common Soldiers of the English Army, were little better than Slaves themselves, in regard to their *Civil Liberty*; and as to their *Property*, they had just as much as the Vassals in Scotland, when under the Dominion of their Lairds and Chiefs.

IV. Concerning Subsidies and hiring foreign Troops.

In the first of these Dissertations it was clearly proved, that Great Britain, though an Island, may be invaded under various Circumstances ; and consequently, that our Government is just so far connected with the Continent, as it is our Interest, first, to prevent those neighbouring Provinces, which lie most commodious for invading us, from falling into an Enemy's Hand ; and secondly, to obstruct him from making use of such Ports and Places for the Purposes of an Invasion, of which he is already possessed. That is, he should neither be suffered to acquire more, as far as our Government can possibly prevent it, nor to carry on his hostile Preparations in those Ports on the adjacent Shore, which, unhappily for us, already belong to him.

———So

—So far the Interests of Great Britain are necessarily connected with the Continent.

The second Dissertation explained the Nature of Industry and Riches; by shewing, that the Enemy may have *Industry*, which is only another Name for *Wealth*, without foreign Trade; and may have foreign Trade without Sea-carriage; and may have Sea-carriage without being the Owners of the Ships; and, therefore the taking of their Ships, or a mere *Sea-war* will not disable them to the Degree, which many among us seem to imagine; nay, that by these Methods, unless we use some others to *co-operate* with them, we shall bring ourselves to the fatal Necessity of being obliged to spend twenty Shillings to their one. The Question therefore will be, Which of the two Nations can hold out the longest at this Rate of Spending?

In the third Dissertation, it is evidently made to appear, that the raising the Militia, by Way of Self-defence, will prove a very *destructive* Measure to us, considered as a manufacturing and commercial People, and a *dangerous* one in regard to our Civil Liberties, and the Freedom of Election: Moreover, that the Instances brought in Favour of this Measure from foreign Countries, or from our own in former Times, or from the Practice of our Colonies abroad, are by no Means a Rule for us in our present Situation, because the Cases and Circumstances are not parallel; and therefore, that it is highly preposterous and absurd to Reason from the Genius and Circumstances of one State to those of another, quite dissimilar and repugnant to them.

Having advanced thus far, my present Undertaking is to shew, *that the sending*
of

of Subsidies Abroad for the Hire of foreign Troops to act on the Continent against France in Case of Need, and in order to divert their Forces from the Purposes of an Invasion, is the best Method we can take in our Situation. I mean, that it is the best, not separately, but in Conjunction with a Sea-war, and a *reasonable* Augmentation of our standing Army at Home. Now the *Mediums*, by which I shall prove it to be the best, are two; 1st. It is the *least expensive* in order to ourselves. 2dly. It will give a greater Diversion to the Troops of France, and cause them to put themselves to *more Charges* than any other Measure we can pursue.

But in regard to the Article of Expence, we must first hear the formidable Objection of our modern Heroes. “ Shall we, say they, send Abroad those precious Treasures, earned with the Sweat of English
Brows,

Brows, which ought to be kept at Home, to pay our own Troops, to support our own Trade and Manufactures, and circulate among ourselves? Are we in such Circumstances, as to send Millions Abroad, never to return again? Or will any of our Neighbours, that are now gaping after English Gold, will they generously return back a few Shillings in Pity and Compassion to us, after we have spent and subsidied away the last Farthing? No, they will not; they will only laugh at us for our foolish ill-placed Generosity, and senseless Conduct."

Now the Authors of this *vulgar inflammatory* Rant, of which our News-papers and Pamphlets are continually full, if they really believe what they say, have yet to learn the very first Rudiments of national Commerce. For the whole Force of this Argument, such as it is, turns upon the
Supposition,

Supposition, *that Money is Wealth*: Whereas Industry, Manufactures, Agriculture, mutual and general Employment, are the *real Wealth* of a Nation; and Money is only the Sign or Certificate of it. It is properly a Tally or Counter for keeping a fair Reckoning between the Effects of Industry in the Possession of one Man compared with that of another, and serves as a Pass-port for the more commodious Transfer of the Produce of such Industry from Hand to Hand. This being the Case, the short Question now before us, is reduced to this. — Which should be your first Aim? To preserve the Thing *signified*, or the *Sign*? If your Endeavours should be to preserve the Thing *signified*, i. e. If you promote general Industry and Commerce, and had rather see your People diligent and useful Manufacturers, than sauntering Militia-men, or strutting

strutting Soldiers, you are sure of retaining the *Sign*, for that must come of Course; inasmuch as Money always follows Industry, not *vice versa*; as you may observe by the Circumstances of Old and New Spain compared with England.

The English have no Mines of Gold, and few or next to none of Silver; and yet the English have greater Plenty of Cash circulating among them than is observable in most other Nations, though abounding with the richest Mines of Gold and Silver. The Hungarians, for Example, have the richest Mines in Europe; they have the best Wines, excellent Horses, a most fruitful Country, and the best accommodated by Nature for an inland Navigation of any in the World, by Means of such Numbers of fine Rivers: Yet the Hungarians are all poor, the common People are miserable and starving; a Piece of Coin is hardly to be seen among them;

them ; and all their natural Advantages lie useless and buried : But why is that ? It is, because the Hungarians are all Militia Men and Soldiers, giving the Preference to the military rather than to the commercial State of Life. And the same Observation may be made on many other Countries. This therefore being the Case, what have you to do when a War becomes UNAVOIDABLE, but to hire as many as are necessary of those Foreigners who prefer the *Soldier* to the *Manufacturer*, to fight your Battles ; and in the mean while to keep your own People usefully and beneficially employed, in Order to be able to maintain them ? Nay, what Method more proper can you take in Regard to *Expence* ? For, please to observe, this is the only Consideration we are now upon. But, you will still reply, *the Money, the Money, the Money goes Abroad*. And in the Name of common Sense, *so let it go* ; for Industry will be sure to fetch it back again

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with Increase : Whereas if you use any other Measures, if you take your People from their Work, and make them Soldiers or Militia-Men, (in Order, as you imagine, to keep the Money at Home) you certainly will be the Cause of its going Abroad, *never to return again*. Perhaps this Argument has rather staggered than convinced you, because you have been used to a different Train of thinking. Take, therefore, a plain Illustration of the Facts before us : The Swiss Cantons, so famous for their Militia, and so much recommended to our Imitation, never send Money to Foreigners by Way of Subsidy, or hiring foreign Troops ; on the contrary, they receive Subsidies in one Shape or other, from almost every Power in Europe. They publicly let out their Troops for Hire ; and their Subjects, when grown old in foreign Service, generally return Home, and bring what they have saved,

saved, to spend among their own Countrymen. Moreover, the Taxes are not high; rather should I say, there are scarce any Taxes at all: And as to the Country, it is extremely populous, and in Regard to Husbandry, well cultivated. Their Governments likewise have Money Abroad in the public Funds; the Interests of which are annually remitted Home; and the Canton of Berne in particular is said to have immense Sums in our Stocks.—

Now with these several Accumulations, would you not conclude (according to the Hypothesis you have hitherto reasoned upon) that a great Part of all the Money in Europe is either gone or a going into Switzerland? and that the Inhabitants of that Country abound more in Gold and Silver than any other People in Europe? And yet, when you examine the Country, you find nothing like it to prove true in Fact:

For Money is not near so plenty in Switzerland, as it is in England, nor do the Inhabitants observe such Heaps upon Heaps as you would expect. Nay, perhaps the Quantity of Cash circulating in that Country, hath been but very little encreased for these hundred Years last past : Whereas here in England, notwithstanding all our Drains, notwithstanding we have *subsidied* away the very last Farthing, been *germanized*, been *bankrupted*, *beggared*, *taxed*, *mortgaged*, *lost*, *ruined*, *undone*, &c. &c. &c. I say, notwithstanding all these doleful Ditties of the tragic Muse, we have more Cash left at this Day, four Times told, than we had a hundred Years ago.— Now both these Cases being Facts, certain, indisputable Facts, how will you account for them? How indeed, but upon this plain Principle, that Switzerland can never be *rich*, while its Inhabitants love Arms rather than manufactures and mechanic Trades;

Trades ; and Great Britain can never be *poor*, while the People are kept to their industrious Employments, and not taken off to be made Soldiers, or Militia-Men ?— Besides, there is another Consideration regarding this Affair, and a very weighty one, though never taken Notice of, *viz.* that every Manufacturer, by his Course of Life, and the Taxes he pays, is a *Pay-Master* to the Army ; if, therefore, you take 20000 *Pay-Masters*, and convert them into *Pay-Receiver*s, by making them Soldiers ; (and the Argument holds still much stronger in the Case of raising the Militia) you not only enhance the Burden that is to be borne by the People, but you subtract from the Numbers of those who were to bear it. Whenever, therefore, you think of employing Natives in War rather than Foreigners, *in Order to save Subsidies, and to ease your own People*, you commit the same Mistake,

Mistake, to use a plain coarse Simile, as if you was to load a Carriage with double its usual Weight, and then take off half the Number of Horses that were to draw it. This truly is an unconscionable Load.—— But remember, that such ignorant, unexperienced, foolish Drivers, are not fit to conduct the political Machine. Therefore, after having set forth, that the paying of Subsidies and hiring foreign Troops is the *least expensive* Measure in Regard to ourselves ; I come now to prove in the second Place, that it will give a more important Diversion to the Troops of France, and cause them to put themselves to greater Charges than any other Method we can pursue. For if their Attention is not to be diverted to some other Object, what should hinder them from employing all their Time, Power, and Revenue towards strengthening their Marine, and preparing for an Invasion ?——The standing Army of France in Times of Peace is near 200,000 Men ;

Men ; of whom about 40,000 are Foreigners, *viz*, Germans, Swifs, English, Scotch, and Irish, whose Pay is *double* to that of the Natives : France likewise sends large Subsidies to foreign Powers, particularly to Prussia and Sweden. Now, should we confine our Views only to a *Sea-War* (from whence the utmost to be expected is, that the Trade of France will be carried on for the Future on *neutral* Bottoms, the Freight of which are at all Times much cheaper than the Freight of French Ships) I say, if our Views extend no farther in Europe than a *Sea-War*, what should hinder the French Government from disbanding one Third of their Land Army, particularly the most expensive Part, their foreign Troops, and reducing, or totally withdrawing their Subsidies paid to foreign Courts,—and *building Ships of War with these Savings*? Is there any Thing chimerical in this Supposition? Nay, is there any Thing in it, but what is most

most natural, and likely to happen? and such as the French will certainly put in Execution, if they know their own Interest?

But, perhaps you will say, for it is the only Thing you can say, That it is the Interest of other Powers on the Continent to prevent the aggrandizing of France, as much as it is ours:—And therefore, if France should be supposed to be moved by Self-Interest to disband a great Part of her Land Army, and withdraw her Subsidies, in Order to become the more formidable *naval* Power, and to make a Conquest of Great Britain; it is likewise the Self-Interest of the other States on the Continent to obstruct her Views, and to raise such Suspensions of *Danger*, by stationing Troops on the Land-Side of France, as shall oblige her to keep her great Armies of *Observation* still on Foot, and to continue all her usual
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Subsidies ;—by which Means she will not be so much at Liberty to push her Conquest and intended Invasion.—This is your Argument in its full Force : But please to observe, that it is inconclusive in almost every Particular ; for in the first Place, it is not so clear, that it is the Interest, I mean the *immediate* Interest of the Powers on the Continent to prevent the Reduction of the *Land-Army* of France : because the Reduction of her Land-Forces would remove the *present* Danger from the States on the Continent, at the same Time that the intended Invasion of Great Britain would be sure of cutting out Work for many Years to come. The *immediate* Danger being thus removed to a *distant Period* by the Reduction of the Land-Forces of France, is it at all to be wondered at, if States and Kingdoms should be found to act like private Persons in Regard to their *present* Interest ? And when

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the *present* is secured, could it be any Surprise to us, if they trusted the *future* to Events and Contingencies ?

Secondly. Allowing, that it is the *present* and *immediate* Interest of the States on the Continent to prevent the Reduction of the Land-Forces of France, under the Circumstances above related ;—doth it follow, that these States, whose *internal* Interests do often vary, and always *interfere* with each other ; I say, doth it follow, that they will all unite with the same Vigour in Support of this their general and common Interest ? And have you any Reason or Authority for supposing it ? Consider the Conduct of our own Colonies in America ; their Example may have the most Weight with you. To them, therefore, I appeal ; and pray tell me, *how many* even of these Colonies do act upon such public-spirited Motives in Regard to the French, as you expect

expect from the Powers on the Continent of Europe? But,

Thirdly. Granting even, that many of the States bordering upon France, would unite to prevent the entire and absolute Conquest of this Island; — doth it follow, that they would run the same Risque, the Risque of a general War, to prevent the dismembering of some Part of our Territories either in Europe or America? And would the same Motives prevail in the one Case, as in the other? Suppose, therefore, the French should give the most solemn Assurances to foreign Courts (and we know, that they have thought proper to appeal to them all for the Justice of their Cause in the present Disputes) suppose they should declare, that though their Arms are crowned with Success, they would give up Great Britain again, provided they retained Ireland or Jamaica, Virginia, Pennsylvania, or New York; —

doth it follow in these Circumstances, that the Germanic Body, or the other European Powers would think their own Interest so deeply concerned as to dispute this Point with France, and light up a general War till these Places were restored? No, they would not: They would look upon it as a very uninteresting Matter in Regard to themselves. And yet, should this ever be the Case in Regard to Great-Britain, what a terrible Disaster would befall us? And how justly might our modern Patriots load the Ministry with the heaviest Reproaches for incurring this irreparable Loss by an ill-timed, foolish Parsimony?

Fourthly. This Argument of yours relating to the States on the Continent, takes *that* for granted in this Case, which you will not allow in any other. For it takes for granted, that the Ministers of all these foreign Powers do both see their Master's true Interests, and pursue them steadily:
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It supposes, that the Princes on the Continent have Ministers so wise and provident, so upright and uncorruptible, that French Gold cannot blind, nor private Interest warp, nor Intrigues, nor Court-Factions divert their Attention from their Country's Good. There is therefore no Need of sending Subsidies to such happy States, whose able, prudent, and faithful Ministers will always suggest to their Masters the Thing that is proper to be done : For they will watch over our Welfare ; they will interest themselves in the Preservation of *every Part* of our Territories, Liberties, Trade, and Navigation, without a Shilling Recompence.—In short, this Argument supposes, that all Ministers are good ; —are ANGELS every where, but in Great Britain ; and there they are always *Devils*. Is this now a true Picture ? Is it credible ; And do you yourself believe

lieve it?—If you do, why do you stay here? Why do you not remove in Order to to be happy, free, rich, and secure, under one of these excellent Governments?

Upon the Whole therefore, since this Argument of yours, drawn from the supposed *immediate* Interest of the States on the Continent to prevent the Reduction of the Land Army of France, hath been proved to be utterly inconclusive; and since you have no other Argument to advance, give me leave to ask, What is to be done on our Part, in Case the French Government should arrive at that Degree of common Prudence, as to pursue their own Interest, and push their Advantages? Or, in other Words, what *Measure* would you advise, in Case they should withdraw their Subsidies, disband a great Part of their Land Army, station a large Body of Troops on the opposite Shore ready every
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Moment to invade us, and at the same Time encrease their Marine with ten or twelve capital Ships every Year, by the Savings arising out of these Reductions?

You *cannot* advise the raising of the *Militia*; because it hath been proved already, that such a Measure is incompatible with our present Liberties, is destructive to a commercial State, and extremely expensive and impoverishing: You *will not* recommend the augmenting of our *standing Army* farther than it is done at present, both for the Reasons above-recited regarding the *Militia*, and for many others: And you *can* have *no Reason to expect*, that the French will be obliged to sue for Peace, while we are spending MILLIONS extraordinary in fitting out our vast Fleets, and supporting our Armies, and they are retrenching even their ordinary and usual Expences. For in such a Case, the longer
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the present War continues, the more will France be able to save, and to support the Continuance of it ; whereas all Things with us will be just the Reverse : So that a *mere Sea-War*, under these Circumstances, will be so far from humbling France, that it will be the sure and certain Method of aggrandizing her, but must prove in the End fatal to Great Britain — Subsidies therefore, and the Hiring of foreign Troops to act on the Continent by Way of *Terror*, is the only Source remaining. And if you object to this Method, you place the French in a much better Situation, as *an Island*, than we ourselves. For what is an Island ? Is it not, in the present View, a Kingdom or State so situated, as to be less exposed to Invasions than other Countries ? — Now if France is to have nothing to fear from the Powers on the Continent, if she is to be rendered quite safe on the Land-side, she will reap all the Benefits

fits of Security attending an Island, at the same Time that she will enjoy all the Sweets of foreign Trade *by Land* attending the Continent. But if you raise a Suspicion and Jealousy, that other Powers are arming against her (which by the by, you cannot do without giving Subsidies :) If you alarm her with the Prospect of impending Danger,—she must both retain her usual Number of Troops in Pay, and encrease them considerably ; she must both continue, and enlarge her Subsidies to foreign Powers in order to counterballance our Treaties ; she must repair her Fortifications, and put her Frontiers in a State of Defence ; and in short, she must expend vast Sums in various Services, and do many Things, which will necessarily drain her Finances, and waste her Strength. And such a Measure becomes the more politic and expedient for Great Britain to pursue at this Juncture, because the Finances of

France are at present in great Disorder; her Credit is low and sunk, her People are quarrelling, divided and dispirited; and the Taxes, which should support her Expences, are injudiciously laid on, ruinous to Commerce, and extremely impoverishing;— And what is still worse, in Regard to the present Consideration, they are pre-engaged and mortgaged to repay Sums already borrowed. — If therefore we can oblige France to spend only Million for Million, or even less, we have the fairest Prospect of succeeding; because when our Government is obliged to give four per Cent. for Interest, theirs with great Difficulty can hardly get it at eight:— So that every Million borrowed, will cost double to them, what it will do to us.

But after all, if these Arguments cannot convince you, I have one more in Reserve which to an *Antigallican* should be all in all;

all; and that is, the Behaviour of France itself on this Occasion: For if these subsidiary Treaties are of small, or no Detriment to France, why is she so much alarmed at them? Why so anxious to counter-act the March of the Russian Troops by bringing the Turks on their Back. France therefore herself justifies these subsidiary Treaties which you condemn; she shews their Utility to Britain, and their Hurtfulness to France, by the great Uneasiness she discovers on their Account: And her very Negotiations at the Porte, her Intrigues with the Ministers of the Divan, (where nothing is to be done without Gold and rich Presents) besides her Cabals, Treaties, &c. at other Courts, are a plain and evident Proof, both that she expends great Sums of Money to prevent these Treaties from having their full Effect, and that she thinks the Money well

bestowed. And yet these are the very Treaties, which you, *in Complaisance to France, and in Order to save her such vast Sums of Money, and to prevent her Distresses*, are endeavouring to annul and cancel ! Either therefore be that *Antigallican* in the *true Sense* of the Word, which your Name imports ; or do not pretend to talk of humbling France, destroying her Marine, ruining her Trade, &c. &c. when you are in Reality using all your Power, Credit and Influence to do the contrary.

One Thing more I have to add, by Way of precluding Cavil and Objection, viz. That though I affirm, that the making subsidiary Treaties, and hiring foreign Troops, is the *cheapest*, the *best*, and the *safest* Expedient we can make use of, I confine the Rule to such Troops only, as are to act upon the Continent. For as long as they remain on the other Side of the Water,

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ter, without Funds, Transports, or Provisions, there is no Danger to be apprehended from them ; because, while we are the Pay-Masters, and can stop our Hands at Pleasure, they will have neither the *Power*, nor the *Will* to invade us : And in *that particular*, our great Advantage, as an Island, doth really consist ; though I have never heard it yet taken Notice of by any of our modern Politicians. But, were foreign Troops to be entertained at Home, our armed Servants would soon be tempted to become our Lords and Masters ; as was the Case of the ancient Britons, when they hired the Saxons to defend them against the Incursions of the Picts and Scots. Therefore, whatever Number of Troops are thought necessary to be kept on Foot *within* this Island, they should all be *Natives* : And yet, for the Reasons already given, as well as for many others, they should be very few in Comparison to the Bulk of the People,

People, who are to pay and support them. But where *that* Consideration is out of the Question,— and the only Article in Dispute is, *Which is the cheapest Method?* I do maintain that it is much cheaper to hire 100,000 Foreigners to fight by Proxy, than it is to take even 20,000 of our own *Manufacturers* and *Pay-Masters*, and convert them into *Soldiers* and *Pay-Receiver*s.—— And what is thus true in Regard to a standing Army, concludes much more forcibly against attempting to raise and discipline a national Militia.

Indeed this State of the Case, in general, concerning Invasions, a Sea-war, Militias, and Subsidiary Treaties may fall short of the sanguine Expectations of many People. For it doth not deal in Dreams, but in Realities; it doth not promise Mountains, where the Event can produce but Mole-hills; nor doth it under-
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take to prove, That the King of France is coming over to prostrate himself before the Parliament, and sue for such a Peace, as none but absolute Conquerors can impose, and none but the miserable Vanquished will submit to. But, instead of these idle Speculations and imaginary Triumphs, it sets forth the naked Truth, and states plain Matters of Facts; and therefore, 'tis to be hoped, puts the Reader in a better Capacity of judging for himself. In short, if we are to have a *War*, we must be content to bear the *necessary unavoidable* Burden of it, according to the above Plan of *numerous* Fleets, *augmented* Land-Armies, and *various* subsidiary Treaties, all which are detrimental to Commerce, and which such as an industrious trading Nation should avoid as much as possible. But, if we prefer Peace, we must likewise expect, that other Nations are as desirous of advantageous Conditions

on their Side, as we can be on ours. Either therefore the War must be *perpetual*, —or one Side must be absolutely *subdued*, —or both Sides must make *some Concessions*. Judge therefore which of these three Propositions is the most reasonable, and the best; and which we must at last take up with.


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


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